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THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
FOR AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
OF STATUTES IN WISCONSIN
SALVATORE MASSA*
Historically, the Wisconsin Legislature has delegated to
administrative agencies the task of interpreting and implementing many
broad mandates through the regulatory process In many instances, this
delegation has led adversely affected parties to challenge an agency's
interpretation of a statute in the state court system. Wisconsin courts
have analyzed agency interpretations of statutes under varying levels of
review, granting an agency great deference in some cases and none at all
in others.2 This varied approach has created some confusion with how
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Neal Stevens for their comments and assistance on this manuscript. The author also thanks
Wisconsin Judge William Eich for the opportunity to serve as his clerk. The views presented
in this Article are not purported to be the views of the United States Department of Justice.
1. See George Bunn, et al., No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial
Enforcement of a Stricter Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking? 1983
Wis. L. REv. 341, 346. The authors observe that the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized
the legislature's ability to delegate legislative power as early as 1928, when the legislature had
given the Insurance Commissioner discretionary authority to disapprove industry regulations
that were offered by the insurance industry. The court reasoned:
The power to declare whether or not there should be a law; to determine the general
purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix the limits within which the law
shall operate-is a power which is vested by our Constitution in the Legislature, and
may not be delegated. When, however, the Legislature has laid down these
fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to
exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general
legislative purpose ....
It only leads to confusion and error to say that the power to fill up the details and
promulgate rules and regulations is not legislative power.
State v. Whitman, 220 N.W. 929,941 (Wis. 1928) (cited by Bunn, et al., at 346-47).
2. A standard of review, understood as "a limiting mechanism which defines an
appellate court's scope of review," is a powerful tool that alters the role of judges. See
Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 231,
232 (1991) (quoting Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377, 379 (1984)).
Hofer describes the concept of standard of review as "set[ting] the height of the hurdles over
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much deference an agency's interpretation is due.
Nowhere has the standard of review played as critical a role in the
outcome of a case as it has in challenges to administrative
interpretations of ambiguous statutes. This Article explores the
contours of the standard of review for interpretations of statutes by
administrative agencies. The first section provides a framework for the
rationale supporting a varied standard of review. The second section
catalogs the criteria Wisconsin courts apply in determining the
appropriate standard of review. The third section illustrates some of the
conflicts and difficulties courts have encountered in applying those
criteria. The fourth section offers some concluding remarks.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR GRANTING DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
When a court reviews an agency action, it can either defer to the
agency or review the action de novo. When it defers, it transfers more
of its discretionary and decision-making authority to the agency than
when it reviews an agency action de novo.4 The exercise of judicial
deference changes which institution acts as the "decision-maker" for the
interpretation of a statute-moving it from courts to administrative
agencies! Thus, when a Wisconsin court elects to grant an agency
"great deference," an agency's interpretation need only be reasonable
for the court to uphold the interpretation.6 In contrast, under de novo
review, a court searches for the most appropriate interpretation of a
statute, regardless of the agency's position.
As institutions, courts and agencies each have strengths and
which an appellant must leap in order to prevail." Hofer, supra, at 232.
3. Challenges against particular agency actions, of course, are not limited to an agency's
interpretation of a statute. For example, parties may challenge an agency's discretionary act
or its interpretation of a contract. See, e.g., Glacier State Distribution Services, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 585 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); Wisconsin End-User Gas
Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 581 N.W.2d 556 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
4. See Hofer, supra note 2, at 232 (the standard of review defines appellate court
"power"). See also Kathryn A. Gilchrist, The Res Judicata Standard of Confirmed Arbitration
Awards in Wisconsin, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 895, 913 (discussing the limited court review of
arbitration awards as preserving "an arbitrator's power to settle disputes in a nonjudicial
forum").
5. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 147-48 (1994) (discussing this
institutional perspective in light of federal courts and agencies).
6. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 539 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Wis.
1995).
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weaknesses which may place one institution in a better position to
resolve a particular case.7 An agency has significant and constant
oversight of a body of regulatory law that a court lacks.' In addition, an
agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute may also possess greater
political legitimacy than a court's interpretation because the legislature
may have intentionally left the statute's meaning open-ended, giving the
agency flexibility to choose how to best achieve the policy goal of the
legislature.9 The legislature may elect to leave a statute ambiguous to
permit an agency to weigh and balance the political interests involved to
reach a compromise unavailable in the legislature. Furthermore, great
specificity and detail in statutory language is often burdensome because
the legislature may have great difficulty in foreseeing the regulatory
issues that may arise-events that agencies are often best equipped to
consider."0 Finally, agencies have vast resources to handle a large
volume of administrative cases."
In contrast, courts are generalists, with a broad-based set of legal
principles embodied in the common law and experience in reviewing a
larger body of statutes. Courts are somewhat removed from the
political process that generates legislation. Because of ethical
constraints, courts are unable to broker the legislative compromises
agencies can reach with the affected interest groups. 2 Moreover, courts
have greater constraints in managing growing caseloads. Thoroughly
reviewing all administrative decisions would prove quite burdensome on
the court system.3
7. See Hofer, supra note 2, at 239-40, discussing the institutional advantages and
disadvantages of these institutions, used the term "better position." He observed that state
agencies may be in a "better position" to determine the meaning of a statute in some
instances. Id.
8. See KOMESAR, supra note 5, at 139-40.
9. See id. at 96-97. Komesar, speaking in the context of federal institutions, suggests that
delegation can be an "attractive political strategy" because of the ability to satisfy different
constituent groups. For example, the legislature may pass a broad mandate for policies
supported by environmentalists while allowing the agency to implement the statute in a way
that supports industry groups. Thus, "delegation provides a way for congressional
representatives to serve both influences." Id. at 96.
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2G88-89 (1990) (discussing this issue in light of federal agencies).
11. See KOMESAR, supra note 5, at 142-49.
12. See WIs. STAT. ANN. S.C.R. 20:3.5(b), 60.03 and 60.04(1)(g) (West 1999). See also
Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tessmer, 580 N.W.2d 307 (Wis. 1998).
13. See Matthew E. Gabrys, Comment, A Shift in the Bottleneck- The Appellate Caseload
Problem Twenty Years After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 1998 WIs. L.
REv. 1547, 1567. Gabrys notes that the legislature initially anticipated that the court of
appeals would adjudicate 1,200 appeals annually. By 1997, 3,763 appeals had been filed with
2000]
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Both institutions also face different political pressures which may
affect the outcomes of their decisions. Because administrative agencies
oversee a narrower body of the law, they interact more directly with the
interest groups that their policies affect.a4 Thus, interest group lobbying
through an agency may be quite effective in shaping that agency's
position, even in situations where it may prove to be ineffective in the
legislature." In addition, the legislature and the governor may directly
pressure the agency to satisfy the needs of constituent groups.16 Unlike
their federal counterparts, Wisconsin state courts are not insulated from
the political process. State judges serve finite terms and must eventually
campaign for election. 7  Judges face a larger, more broadly based
the court. Since its inception, the court of appeals's caseload has grown 300% while staffing
has grown 33%. See id. at 1589. Gabrys concludes that the increased caseload has
overburdened the court, requiring added staff. As a symbol of an overburdened court, he
points to the correlation between the increase in caseload and an increase in affirmances. See
id. at 1593. If Gabrys's theory is correct, the addition of more cases reviewing administrative
actions would further strain the integrity of the court system.
14. See KOMESAR, supra note 5, at 141. Richard Posner discusses this issue with respect
to federal agencies and courts from a law and economics perspective, stating:
The regulatory function could have just as well been delegated to the courts whose
traditional role is precisely to formulate and apply rules regulating activities that are
often complex, using the criterion of efficiency. One can argue that the case method
constrains the rulemaking effectiveness of courts but since most of the agencies have
relied heavily on the case method as their legislative technique, the argument
provides little basis for preferring agencies to courts. Certainly the agencies have
proved more susceptible to political influence than courts. Their more specialized
jurisdiction subjects them to closer scrutiny by congressional appropriations
subcommittees, through which the political influences that play on Congress are
transmitted to the agency, and to closer attention by the industries that the agency
regulates. The political independence of agencies is also less than that of judges
because their members serve for limited terms and turnover is in fact rapid.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 605 (4th ed., 1992).
15. Anecdotal evidence of lobbying efforts in the state abounds. For example, the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources has faced lobbying pressures from various
interest groups and influence from the governor and the legislature. See Tom Vanden Brook,
Lawmaker Seeks To Restore DNR Autonomy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 22, 1999, at
MLWK 2; Ron Seely, Cranberry Boom Has a Downside: Expansion Has Brought
Environmental Damage, WiS. ST. J., Nov. 22, 1998, at 1A (discussing political clout of
cranberry growers in thwarting efforts at environmental regulation).
16. See KOMESAR, supra note 5, at 141; POSNER, supra note 14, at 605. See also supra
note 15.
17. The terms of judges vary by the tribunal. Circuit court judges and court of appeals
judges have six-year terms of office. See WiS. CONST. art. VII, § 7; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 752.04
(West 1999). Supreme court justices, however, have ten-year terms of office. WIS. CONST.
art. VII, § 4.
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constituency in elections, because they must campaign in the area of
their jurisdiction. 8 The need for greater constituent support may make
Wisconsin judges less susceptible to the smaller subset of special interest
groups that lobbies an agency over a particular statute. And, while
supreme court justices enjoy longer tenure in office than state
legislators, elections can become quite contentious over politically
unpopular decisions.' 9
In addition to the transfers of decision-making ability between
courts and agencies, judicial deference or de novo review may also
create interplay with other institutions. A court's review of an agency's
interpretation of a statute can spur the legislature to clarify the statute's
meaning. Similarly, federal institutions may become involved-pre-
empting a state statute or a court's or agency's interpretation of one.2'
The interplay with other institutions acts as a critical check in instances
where an agency becomes captive to interest groups or the courts
become out of touch with the social goals encompassing a particular
statute.
Recognizing that comparative advantages exist in different
institutions, the court system's use of deference can act as a device to
determine which institution is better suited to decide a particular
matter.' Indeed, the legislature has specifically instructed courts to give
1& See WIS. CoNsT. art. VII, §§ 4,7; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 752.04 (West 1999).
19. Popular lore suggests that the last supreme court justice incumbent who lost an
election, Chief Justice George Currie, was unseated because voters "blamed" him "for casting
the deciding vote in a court ruling that allowed in 1967 the Milwaukee Braves to leave
Wisconsin." Daniel Callender, High Court Race: Can Restraint Win War of the Rose, CAP.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at IA. This election took place in 1967. See also Craig Gilbert, Low-
Profile Races Will Have Big Impact, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 1999, at MLWK 2.
20. The legislature has sometimes re-evaluated court interpretations of the common law.
For example, Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg involved common law principles guiding the
reasonableness of the time and scope of a covenant not to compete in an employment
contract. 70 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1955). The court in Torborg changed its approach to
reviewing such contracts. After the decision, the Wisconsin legislature passed a bill which
effectively nullified the court's change of the common law. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103A65
(West 1999). This case and the subsequent legislative action are discussed in RICHARD
DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM 44-67 (1978).
21. This interaction is quite evident in state cases that address federal pre-emption. See,
e.g., State v. Wisconsin Cent. Transp. Corp., 546 N.W.2d 206 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), affd per
curiam, 562 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. 1997).
22. Several legal scholars have examined the institutional impact of court deference to
agency interpretations in the federal courts since the United States Supreme Court decided
Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1987). For
commentaries on Chevron see, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure
of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV., 593 (1995); Sunstein, supra note
10; Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
2000]
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"due weight" to agency interpretations of statutes in light of "the
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the
agency involved, as well as discretionary authority conferred upon it.
'' 3
Courts have similarly justified deference by recognizing the importance
of institutional choice.24 Indeed, courts have often justified the standard
of review along two important attributes that capture both the political
and practical characteristics of both agencies: (1) the political legitimacy
and authority of the agency's determination; and (2) the existence of a
comparative advantage of agency expertise over the courts in the
specific issue being challenged.
As a prerequisite to granting deference, a court must find that "the
agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the
statute."' The court also considers whether "the agency employed its
expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation" to
determine how much deference is appropriate.6 When an agency has
"some experience" over the disputed statute, but has not acquired an
"expertise" that would place it "in a better position to make judgments"
than a court, the agency receives less deference. 2' However, the court's
experience in interpreting a statutory provision diminishes the agency's
comparative advantage and reduces the level of deference the agency
will receive.?
The other legal factors affecting the appropriate level of deference
reflect concern over both the political legitimacy and expertise of the
agency. Before granting "great deference" review to an agency, courts
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Demand for Judicial
Review, 88 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1988).
23. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.57(10) (West 1999).
24. See, e.g., UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 548 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Wis. 1996) ("Which level [of
deference] is appropriate depends on the comparative institutional capabilities and
qualifications of the court and the administrative agency.") (citation and quotations omitted);
Sauk County v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 477 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wis. 1991)
(J. Abrahamson, dissenting) ("[T]he weight that is due an agency's interpretation of the law
depends on the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the court and the
administrative agency in deciding the issue"); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 357 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Wis. 1984); Sawyer Zoning Bd. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Workforce Development, 1999 WL 1059931 *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov.
23,1999) (quoting UFE passage cited above).
25. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus: Review Comm'n, 539 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Wis.
1996); see also UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 62 (requiring a finding that "the legislature has charged
the agency with the enforcement of the statute in question" before granting an intermediate
level of deference).
26. Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
27. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 62.
28. See, e.g., Byers v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 561 N.W.2d 678,680 (Wis. 1997).
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examine whether the agency's interpretation is "long-standing." 29 This
"long-standing" requirement addresses the political legitimacy of the
agency's interpretation because the legislature would have had a greater
opportunity to become aware of the agency's interpretation and to
modify it if it did not comport with the legislature's view of the statute.'
The "long-standing" requirement also reflects a rough estimation of
agency expertise, if one is willing to assume that the passage of time
engenders specialized knowledge in an agency.
Yet another prerequisite for granting "great deference," that the
agency's interpretation "will provide uniformity and consistency in the
application of the statute," also reflects the political legitimacy of the
agency's interpretation as well as its expertise over the regulatory
statutes in its field.3 An interpretation that provides greater consistency
and uniformity within a greater statutory scheme may represent a proxy
for legislative intent because it does not contravene or obscure other
legislative mandates. Furthermore, such an interpretation suggests that
the agency has carefully considered the meaning of the statute in light of
the overall goals of the legislation in that field of law.
HI. THE WISCONSIN APPROACH TO AGENCY DETERMINATIONS
While the courts have recognized the fundamental institutional
question of who is better able to decide a particular matter, formalistic
requirements for varying levels of deference exist. This formalistic
approach channels the reviewing court's inquiry over various factors
that first address the threshold issue of when an agency interpretation of
a statute is relevant, and then address which standard is appropriate to
the given set of facts. This section is divided into two parts that discuss
the legal rules relevant to both steps of this legal inquiry.
A. The Threshold Question: When Deference Becomes Relevant
As a preliminary matter, an agency's interpretation of a statute is an
"extrinsic source" used to "determine the intent of the legislature."' A
29. Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
30. See, e.g., Hacker v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 541 N.W.2d 766, 772
(Wis. 1995); Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wisconsin Employment Review Comm'n, 262
N.W.2d 218, 226 (Wis. 1978) ("Long-standing administrative construction of a statute is
accorded great weight in the determination of legislative intent because the legislature is
presumed to have acquiesced in that construction if it has not amended the
statute.")(emphasis added).
31. Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
32. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 61.
2000]
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court's reliance on an extrinsic aid, like an agency interpretation, is
unnecessary when the statute is unambiguous.' When the statute is
unambiguous, a court's interpretation turns on the "plain meaning" of
the language.' When a court can ascertain a clear, prescient meaning, it
will not uphold an agency interpretation that directly contravenes the
language of the statute even assuming that the agency's position is
granted the highest level of deference. 5  Thus, an agency's
interpretation begins to influence a court's interpretation of a statute
only when the statute is ambiguous.' Ambiguity exists in the language
of a statute when "reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning. '
While the party appealing any agency interpretation may dispute the
meaning of statutory language, Wisconsin courts have equated
"reasonableness" with "sensible interpretations. '' 8
Once a court is satisfied that a statutory provision is ambiguous, the
parties face another issue: determining whether the agency in question is
the appropriate entity which to grant deference. While agency expertise
in a particular matter is the ostensible rationale supporting court
deference, formal legislative empowerment to make ultimate legal
conclusions as a policymaking entity is a crucial requirement. This
distinction is vital in situations where two agencies may implement the
same statutory scheme and may challenge each other's views. Because
33. See id. at 60.
34. Id.; MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. State, 553 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), affd
562 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1997) ("If the plain meaning is clear, we do not look to rules of
statutory construction or other extrinsic aids. Instead, we simply apply the language of the
statute to the facts before us." (citing State Historical Soc'y v. Maple Bluff, 332 N.W.2d 792,
795 (Wis. 1983))).
35. See UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 61; Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102-03. For an example of
a situation where a court finds that the agency interpretation contravenes the clear meaning
of the statute, see Lincoln Savings Bank, S.A. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 573 N.W.2d 522,
528 (Wis. 1998) ("Because we conclude that the transitional rule is clear and unambiguous,
we will not give any deference to the Commission's interpretation of [the statute at issue]
which directly contravenes that clear meaning.").
36. See UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 60. Nonetheless, sometimes a reviewing court will first
determine the deference it accords an agency before determining whether the statutory
provision at issue is ambiguous. See, e.g., Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 562 N.W.2d
917, 922 (Wis. 1997). In Coutts, the supreme court opinion determined the appropriate
standard of review for the agency before turning to the question of whether the statute is
ambiguous. The court stated: "Having determined the appropriate standard of review, we
turn next to interpreting the statutory provision at issue in these cases." Id. Furthermore, the
court ultimately found the statute at issue to be "unambiguous," but "assume[d] solely for the
sake of the inquiry that the statutory language is ambiguous." Id. at 923.
37. Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 103 (quoted in UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 61).
38. Id.
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of specific legislative mandates, reviewing courts may find themselves in
the curious position of granting deference to agencies such as the
Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission or the Wisconsin Labor and
Industry Review Commission, but unable to grant deference to the
Wisconsin Department of Revenue or the Wisconsin Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations."
This distinction is also significant in referrals to an administrative
body not responsible for administering a statute. For example, a
decision rendered by a hearing examiner in the Wisconsin Department
of Administration, which provides management assistance to other
agencies, will not be granted deference if it opines on the definition of a
term in the International Fuel Tax Agreement administered by the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation.' Similarly, courts have
refused to grant deference for questions surrounding an agency's
jurisdiction over a particular matter.41 And, because intermediate
appellate review remains steadfastly focused on the administrative
decision, a lower court's conclusion and analysis are never given
deference.'
An additional important legal demarcation exists for reviewing
"factual" findings of an administrative agency and legal conclusions that
rely on statutory interpretation. "'[Q]uestions of fact' concern 'a
person's acts, or his [or her] intent in doing such acts,' while questions of
law involve 'whether the facts fulfill a particular legal standard."'4 3 One
39. See, e.g., Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Labor & Indus.
Review Comm'n, 467 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Wis. 1991); Wisconsin Dep't of Rev. v. Lake Wisc.
Country Club, 365 N.W.2d 916,918 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
40. See Roehl Transport, Inc. v. Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, 570
N.W.2d 864, 868 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). But see Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 588 N.W.2d 667, 670-71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding that deference is appropriate to the Division of Hearing and Appeals when an
agency formally adopts the decision as it may in WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.46(3)(a) (West
1999)).
41. See e.g., American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Rev., 571 N.W.2d
710, 713-14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 586 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1998) (court
refused to grant deference because dispute involved an interpretation of a federal
nondiscrimination taxing statute); Miller Brewing Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations, 553 N.W.2d 837 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), affd 563 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1997)
(court does not grant agency deference because dispute involved agency's subject matter
jurisdiction).
42. Sterlingworth Condominium Ass'n v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Natural Resources, 556
N.W.2d 791,794 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
43. Paul B. Hewitt, Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Decisions in Wisconsin, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 554, 556 (citing Cheese v. Industrial Comm'n, 123
N.W.2d 553, 557 (Wis. 1963); Milwaukee County v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
2000]
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commentator has argued that the distinction between "fact" and "law"
represents another form of institutional choice where it is recognized
that lower tribunals are more apt at determining "facts" and appellate
tribunals are better positioned to determine "law." 44  Administrative
agency adjudications, like those with respect to workers' compensation
determinations, often mix fact-finding with the application of statutes.4
Where fact-finding ends and legal interpretation begins, however, has
sometimes been difficult for Wisconsin courts to discern when reviewing
agency determinations.' In earlier cases, the distinction between fact
and law became so confused that the Wisconsin Supreme Court treated
an identical issue as one of fact in one case and one of law in another.47
Relations, 180 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Wis. 1970); Local 75, Drivers, Whse. & Dairy Employees v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 138 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1965)).
44. See Hofer, supra note 2, at 238. Hofer argues that labels such as "question of fact"
and "'question of law' have outlived their usefulness in appellate law" as a tool for
determining the appropriate standard of review. Id at 250. Instead, Hofer contends, "an
appellate court defers to a determination made below when it has reason to believe the lower
tribunal was, for whatever reason, in a better position to make that particular determination."
Id. Hofer also cites to State v. Peppin which states:
The rationale behind all appellate review may be fairly characterized in two
extremes: an appellate court will defer in large part to a trial court's determination
where the lower court is in a better position to make the determination than is the
appellate court; conversely, little or no deference is accorded where the appellate
court is as capable of determining the question as is the trial court. Questions of fact
are accorded deference because the trial court was present at the reception of
evidence and had an opportunity to view the demeanor of witnesses and assess their
credibility.... Questions of law, on the other hand, are traditionally accorded little
or no deference because there is nothing intrinsic to their determination which gives
the trial court any advantage over an appellate court.
328 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). See also Town of Russell Volunteer Fire Dep't v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 589 N.W.2d 445,450 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
45. See, e.g., Lange v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n., 573 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997).
46. In Madison Teachers, Inc v. Wisconsin Employment Review Commission, the agency
interpreted the applicability of a mandatory collective bargaining statute. 580 N.W.2d 375
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998). The language of the statute required mandatory collective bargaining
when labor issues were "primarily related" to "wages, hours and conditions of employment."
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (1) (a) (West 1999). The court of appeals concluded that the
agency's decision of whether a particular issue satisfied the "primarily related" language was
a factual one. Madison Teachers, 580 N.W.2d at 379.
47. In Department of Taxation v. Pabst, the central dispute involved whether the Pabst
family trusts were "administered" within the meaning of a statute. 112 N.W.2d 161 (Wis.
1961). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the administrative agency's determination of
this issue as one of fact, applying an entirely different standard of review. Two years later in
Pabst v. Department of Taxation, the court confronted essentially the same issue: whether a
trust had been "administered" under the applicable statute. 120 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1963). On
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Factual determinations are reviewed differently and will be
overturned only when "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence in view of
the record as submitted."' Review under the "substantial evidence"
test tips strongly in favor of the agency. Courts will set aside such
determinations only if no "reasonable person" could have reached the
agency's conclusion.49 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained on
one occasion: "Substantial evidence does not mean a preponderance of
the evidence. Rather, the test is whether, taking into account all the
evidence in the record, 'reasonable minds could arrive at the same
conclusion as the agency."'0 Thus, court review of administrative
findings of facts is uniformly deferential, unlike the more varied
approach applied to agency interpretations of statutes.
B. The Three Standards of Review
Wisconsin courts apply three different standards of review to agency
interpretations: (1) "great deference"; (2) "due weight"; and (3) de
novo. As the name suggests, great deference provides the agency the
greatest level of deference while de novo review provides no deference
at all. Due weight deference falls between these extremes. This section
discusses each level of review, beginning with great deference and
concluding with de novo review.
When a Wisconsin court uses the great deference standard of review,
judicial review of an agency's interpretation is at its weakest. The court
need only determine that an agency's interpretation of a statute is
reasonable for the agency's position to prevail."1 In order to prevail, the
party challenging the agency must satisfy the onerous burden of showing
that the agency's interpretation is "clearly contrary to legislative intent
or it is without rational basis." Thus, even if another, more reasonable
this occasion, however, the court reviewed the agency's determination as one of law. See also
Hewitt, supra note 43, at 557-58.
48. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.57 (1)(d) (West 1999), construed in Green Bay & W.R.
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 68 N.W.2d 828 (Wis. 1955).
49. Daly v. Natural Resources Bd., 208 N.W.2d 839, 846 (Wis. 1973), cert denied 414
U.S. 1137 (1974).
50. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 325 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Wis.
1982) (quoted source omitted).
51. See Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
52. Id. at 103. The Harnischfeger court also noted that an agency's statutory
interpretation could be shown to be unreasonable if it "directly contravenes the words of the
statute." Id. See also Lisney v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 493 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Wis.
1992) ("An agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable if it accords with the language of
the statute, the statute's legislative history, and the legislative intent; if the interpretation is
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interpretation of a statute exists, a court will still uphold the agency's
interpretation as long as it is reasonable. 3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Harnischfeger v. Labor
and Industry Review Commission sets out the present criteria for great
deference. 4 Courts grant this deferential review only if four criteria are
met: (1) the agency is charged by the legislature to administer the
statute in question; (2) the agency's interpretation is long-standing; (3)
the agency employed its expertise in interpreting the statute; and (4) the
interpretation will provide a uniform and consistent application of the
statute.5 Harnischfeger provides an excellent example of a situation
where all four of these factors are present.
The Harnischfeger Corporation challenged the Wisconsin Labor and
consistent with the constitution, the statute read as a whole, and the purpose of the statute;
and if the interpretation is consistent with judicial analyses of the statute."). However, once a
court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it is impossible for a challenger to suggest that
the agency interpretation directly contravenes the language of the statute. See Harnischfeger,
539 N.W.2d at 103.
53. Barron Elec. Coop. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 569 N.W.2d 726, 731 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997).
54. 539 N.W.2d 98 (Wis. 1996). Harnischfeger represented a departure from earlier
cases which had a lower threshold for granting great deference review. The case that
Harnischfeger cites that provides its criteria for great deference states:
Courts will give varying degrees of deference to an agency's interpretation of a
statute when they have concluded that the legislature charged the agency with the
duty of administering the statute; that the agency's interpretation is of long standing;
that the agency's interpretation entails its expertise, technical competence and
specialized knowledge; and that through interpretation and application of the
statute, the agency can provide uniformity and consistency in the field of its
specialized knowledge.
Lisney, 493 N.W.2d at 16 (cited by Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102). Harnischfeger
suggested that all these criteria must be met before a court will grant great deference, while
Lisney did not require all these criteria to be met. The Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to
indicate that it was changing the law in Harnischfeger and, indeed, cited Lisney for the
proposition that
[g]reat weight deference is appropriate once a court has concluded that: (1) the
agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2)
that the interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; (3) that the agency
employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; and
(4) that the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the
application of the statute.
Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
55. See Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
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Industry Commission's ("LIRC") workers' compensation award and
finding that three employees suffered hearing loss as a result of their
employment. LIRC interpreted a Wisconsin statutory provision that
extended workers' compensation liability when "employment has
contributed" to hearing loss, but not for "previous deafness."" The
statute, however, did not define "previous deafness" or address the
threshold question of when "hearing loss" should become compensable.
During the mid-1950s, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations developed an administrative rule to clarify compensation for
occupational hearing loss. The rule set a threshold requiring a hearing
loss exceeding thirty decibels before compensation was appropriate
under the Worker's Compensation Act.' LIRC developed a system
where each loss of a decibel of hearing above thirty decibels would
result in an incremental occupational deafness of 1.6%, until the loss
reaches 100%." After the adoption of the LIRC rules, the Wisconsin
legislature had apparently considered the impact of the rules and let
them stand. 9
Harnischfeger challenged LIRC's application of the statute to
employees who had a previous level of hearing loss exceeding thirty
decibels. In such cases, LIRC subtracted the previous level of hearing
loss from the current level6 Thus, an employer hiring a worker with
some hearing impairment would not enjoy the thirty-decibel buffer that
it would with an employee with perfect hearing.
The Harnischfeger court granted great deference to the agency,
reasoning that:
LIRC and its predecessors have long been charged with the duty
of administering Chapter 102 [which governs workers'
compensation] and have exercised their expertise in analyzing
and interpreting its various sections for over 80 years.
Furthermore, both Wis. Stat. § 102.555 and the administrative
rules which interpreted § 102.555 had-prior to LIRC's decisions
in this proceeding-been the subject of active and careful
consideration by both the legislature and DIHLR. Finally, LIRC
has consistently interpreted § 102.555(8) so as to provide
56. Wis. STAT. § 102.555(8) (1993-94).
57. WIS. ADM. CODE § IND 80.25 (1993) (now found in Wis. ADM. CODE. § 80.25).
58. See Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 101.
59. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Oglesby, 323 N.W.2d 143,144 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
60. See Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 101.
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uniformity in the application of Chapter 102.61
Agency challengers attempting to avoid great deference review often
argue that the agency interpretation is not long-standing because of
altered factual circumstances. 62  For example, in Barron Electric
Cooperative v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, the party
challenging the Public Service Commission's interpretation of a statute
governing electric service extensions to new customers argued that the
agency had not decided a case whose facts were wholly analogous in
applying the statute.6 However, the focus of the court's inquiry turned
more on the length of time the agency had interpreted the statute under
various factual settings. The court explained:
The test is not, however, whether the commission has ruled on
the precise-or even substantially similar-facts in prior cases. If
it were, given the myriad factual situations to which the
provisions of chapter 196, Stats., may apply, deference would
indeed be a rarity. Rather, the cases tell us that the key in
determining what, if any, deference courts are to pay to an
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute is the agency's
experience in administering the particular statutory scheme-and
that experience must necessarily derive from consideration of a
variety of factual situations and circumstances. 64
Even when an agency fails to attain great deference review, a court
may grant an intermediate level of deference: due weight deference.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted that this intermediate level of
deference "is appropriate when the agency has some experience in an
area, but has not developed the expertise which necessarily places it in a
better position to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the
61. Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
62. See, e.g., Barron, 569 N.W.2d at 732; Bret v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 553
N.W.2d 550. 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Lifedata Med. Serv. v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm'n, 531 N.W.2d 451,454-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
63. Barron Elec., 569 N.W.2d at 732. The statute at issue in the case was WIS. STAT. §
196.495 (1995-96).
64. Id.; see also Drummond v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 352 N.W.2d
662, 663 (Wis. Ct. App.), aff'd, 358 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. 1984) (concluding that "agency
expertise" does not require experience with the exact fact situation-expertise in related
fields is sufficient).
65. In the cases, "due weight" is also synonymous with a "great bearing" standard of
review. See Sauk County v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 477 N.W.2d 267, 270
(Wis. 1991).
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statute than a court." Given this justification for an intermediate level
of deference, it is unsurprising to find that the two criteria for due
weight deference are: (1) the agency has gained some experience in
administering the statute; and (2) "the legislature has charged the
agency with the enforcement of the statute in question."67
Due weight deference extends the scope of review for a court: a
court need not defer to an agency's "reasonable" interpretation if it
finds another interpretation which is the "best and most reasonable."
'
The "important difference" between great deference and due weight
deference is that "a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an
agency's interpretation under due weight deference, while under great
weight deference, a more reasonable interpretation will not overcome
an agency's interpretation, as long as the agency's interpretation falls
within a range of reasonableness." 69 Thus, if a reviewing court finds "an
alternative interpretation more reasonable," it is free to reject the
agency's interpretation." However, when the competing interpretations
of a statute appear equally reasonable, an agency determination should
not be reversed-presumably because the agency is entitled to
deference.7
The key characteristic defining due weight deference cases is the
recognition that but for the paucity of decisions interpreting the statute
under various factual settings, the agency's interpretation would have
likely received great deference review. In UFE, Inc. v. Labor and
Industry Review Commission, the statute at issue dealt with employer
obligations to pay employee health expefises incurred outside Wisconsin
for work related injuries.7 The statute gives employees injured during
66. UFE, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 548 N.W.2d 57,62 (Wis. 1996).
67. Id.
68. Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has described this
standard of review as "very different than the deference granted to an agency under the great
weight standard." UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 62.
69. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 63, n.3.
70. Id. at 63.
71. See id. at 63, n.3.
72. The statute at issue provides in part:
Where the employer has notice of an injury and its relationship to the employment
the employer shall offer to the injured employe his or her choice of any physician,
chiropractor, psychologist or podiatrist licensed to practice and practicing in this
state for treatment of the injury. By mutual agreement, the employe may have the
choice of any qualified practitioner not licensed in this state.... Treatment by a
practitioner on referral by another practitioner is deemed to be treatment by one
practitioner.
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the course of work the right to select a Wisconsin physician to attend to
their injuries, and the employer is financially responsible. However, if
an employee selects a doctor "not licensed in this state," the employer
must consent before becoming liable for the costs of the doctor's
services. 3
In UFE, an injured employee selected a Wisconsin physician who
eventually recommended treatment at a clinic in Minnesota.' UFE
contended that it had to consent before it could become liable for the
employee's medical bills in Minnesota.' However, LIRC disagreed,
relying on another provision of the statute which stated that
"[t]reatment by a practitioner on referral by another practitioner is
deemed to be treatment by one practitioner."76 According to LIRC,
because the Wisconsin physician referred the employee to an out-of-
state clinic, "one practitioner" provided the treatment-the Wisconsin
doctor whom the employee had the right to select without employer
consent.?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court elected to give the agency due weight
deference, reasoning that "[a]lthough it has not developed the expertise
and specialized knowledge necessary to be accorded great weight
deference, this case is not the first time LIRC has interpreted [the
statutory provision]."'78 After recognizing that the agency had "some
experience in determining the proper medical expenses for which an
employer is responsible," the court evaluated the Wisconsin legislature's
"basic purpose" in enacting the Worker's Compensation Act-of which
the statute was a part.7 ' The court noted that the purpose of the Act was
"to ensure that employees who become injured or ill through their
employment receive the prompt and comprehensive medical treatment
that is necessary for their well-being. '
The court then examined both LIFE's and the agency's
interpretation of the statute in light of the purpose of the statute and
concluded that the agency's interpretation "promotes the underlying
WiS. STAT. § 102.42(2)(a) (1993-94).
73. Id.
74. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 59.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 61.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 63.
79. See id.
80. Id.
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purpose of the Act to a greater degree than UFE's" interpretation."'
The court observed that LIRC's interpretation "allowed employees to
more readily receive the treatment that they need."' Once an employee
selects a Wisconsin physician, that physician has "more flexibility" when
deciding the appropriate treatment for the injury "without being
concerned that the employer will refuse to consent to the suggested
care." And, while UFE apparently made public policy arguments
criticizing the agency's position, the court noted that to the extent such
arguments have "any merit" they cannot "overcome both the fact that
LIRC's interpretation is entitled to due weight deference and the fact
that LIRC's interpretation more readily effectuates the purpose of the
Act.,
84
The UFE court's reliance on the "basic purpose" of the Worker's
Compensation Act to justify the agency's interpretation demonstrates
the expanded scope of review in due weight deference cases that allows
a reviewing court to search for more reasonable interpretations of a
statute by using other extrinsic sources. While a court is free to use such
extrinsic sources whenever a statute is ambiguous, these alternative
sources play a greater role when an agency's determination receives less
deference." Other due weight deference cases have explored the
purpose of a statute or turned to other forms of legislative history to
scrutinize the agency's interpretation.'
When an agency fails to satisfy the requirements for due weight
deference or other circumstances exist that undermine the justification
for deference, courts review the agency's interpretation de novo. There
are at least five possible circumstances when de novo review becomes
appropriate: (1) the agency's decision is one of "first impression"; (2)
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id. at 64.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Rev. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 561 N.W.2d 344, 347
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that when a statute is ambiguous, a court may "examine the
scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute.").
86. In Gould v. Department of Health and Soc. Services, the court of appeals examined
the purpose of a statute designed to prevent individuals from receiving payments from the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) simultaneously before concluding that the agency's decision was at least equally
reasonable to Gould's interpretation. 576 N.W.2d 292 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(24)(1994). In Telemark Developmen4 Inc. v. Department of Rev., another case where
the court of appeals gave due weight deference to the agency, it examined both the language
of the statute at issue and additional legislative history. 581 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998).
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the agency is not charged with interpreting the statute at issue; (3) the
statute interpreted raises a jurisdictional question, such as the
constitutional limits of its conduct; (4) the agency's prior decisions are so
inconsistent that they provide a court little or no guidance; and (5) prior
appellate court decisions have interpreted the same statute that the
agency has interpreted.
When an agency's interpretation "is clearly one of first impression,"
courts grant de novo review? As the name suggests, in a case of first
impression the agency confronts the statutory ambiguity for the first
time and can rely on no agency precedent directly on point for its
interpretation.' Cases of first impression are sometimes difficult to
distinguish from cases where an agency has "some experience" and is
accorded due weight deference. A fine line exists between due weight
deference and de novo review in that due weight deference is
appropriate even "'if the agency decision is "very nearly" one of first
impression."' 9 In Zignego Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, the
court of appeals concluded that due weight deference was appropriate
because the legislature had charged the agency, the Tax Appeals
Commission, with enforcement of the statute and the agency "had at
least one opportunity to analyze that statute and formulate a position."
However, when an agency's interpretation of a statute rendered other
decisions on the same issue that were issued simultaneous to the
decision that forms the basis of the case before the court, the agency
decision is one of first impression. 9
De novo review is also appropriate when the legislature has not
charged the agency to enforce the disputed statute. This problem arises
when a "substitute" agency decides a matter or when two agencies may
potentially have overlapping jurisdiction. These situations have been
discussed earlier in this Article.'
A court may also grant de novo review when an agency's
interpretation of a statute leads it to regulate a new subject matter which
raises a jurisdictional issue.' The jurisdiction question grows more
87. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 62.
88. See, e.g., Sauk County v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 477 N.W.2d
267,277 (Wis. 1991).
89. Tannler v. Department of Health & Soc. Serv., 564 N.W.2d 735,738 (Wis. 1997).
90. 565 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). Zignego involved a dispute over the
application of a statute of limitations provision found in Wis. Stat. Ann. § 77.59(3). See id.
91. See Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 562 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Wis. 1997).
92 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Klingeisen v. Department of Natural Resources, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. Ct.
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complicated where the agency interprets a federal statute.f Generally,
Wisconsin courts will conclude that the legislature has charged an
agency with interpreting a federal statute when the agency's mission is
related to implementing federal laws. Thus, no jurisdictional problem
exists when the Department of Health and Social Services interprets
federal directives for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
programs or the Department of Revenue interprets portions of the
federal tax code as they affect the Wisconsin taxing scheme.9 With that
said, some difficulty arises when a state agency begins to interpret its
jurisdictional bounds under federal statutes. For example, in American
Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, the
court of appeals refused to grant deference to the Tax Appeals
Commission's decision interpreting a federal statute which barred taxing
practices that favored state tax exempt bonds over federal ones.9 The
effect of the commission's decision would have expanded the potential
reach of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue's taxing authority and
interpreted the scope of taxing immunity under the United States
Constitution.'
Courts have also held that de novo review is appropriate when an
agency's "position on an issue has been so inconsistent so as to provide
no real guidance." ' s Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Department of Industry,
App. 1991). The court of appeals reviewed the agency's determination that it had jurisdiction
to regulate de novo "[b]ecause a question of law is involved and there is no evidence in the
record or by reported cases of the [agency's] special expertise in determining jurisdiction in
this case of first impression." See id. at 605.
94. Some earlier cases adopted the view that agencies should be reviewed de novo when
the dispute involved an interpretation of a federal statute. See e.g., Swanson v. Department.
of Health & Soc. Serv., 312 N.W.2d 833,835 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
95. See, eg., Tannler, 564 N.W.2d 735; Gould, 576 N.W.2d 292; Heritage Mut. Ins. Co.,
561 N.W.2d 344; see also Murphy v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 515 N.W.2d 487 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994) (LIRC interprets federal statutes related to state unemployment
compensation provisions).
96. 571 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 586 N.W.2d 872 (Wis.
1998); see also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3124(a)(1) (West 1999). Another earlier case from the court of
appeals reached a similar result. See William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 451
N.W.2d 444, 447 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 465 N.W.2d 800 (Wis. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 214 (1992).
97. The bar against state taxation of federal obligations codified in 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a)
has been described by the United States Supreme Court as a "restatement of the
constitutional rule... of tax immunity established in McCulloch v. Maryland." Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. Gamer, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983) (quoted in American Family, 571
N.W.2d at 714).
98. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 62; see also Coutts, 562 N.W.2d at 921; Marten Transp., Ltd. v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 501 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Wis. 1993).
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Labor and Human Relations provides an illustration of a case where this
scenario exists.' In Marten, an administrative law judge issued a
decision that awarded back pay, reinstatement and other relief to a
former employee of Marten. The administrative law judge ("A")
found that Marten had discriminated against the former employee in
violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act and that the back pay
and reinstatement award was appropriate even though the employee
had left Marten voluntarily."' Marten appealed to an agency review
board, and the board affirmed the AJ's decision.
Two months later, the agency reached the opposite result in another
case, concluding that neither an award of back pay nor reinstatement
was an appropriate remedy when a former employee who suffered
discrimination was not discharged. The agency did little to explain or
justify the reversal of its previous position in the subsequent
administrative proceeding. 1 In viewing the two rulings, the court said,
"Although LIRC awarded back pay and reinstatement in the present
case, LIRC did not award either [in the subsequent agency decision].
Such inconsistency leads us to give no weight to either decision. '
While inexplicable changes in an agency's position over the
interpretation of a statute have led courts to grant de novo review,
agency modifications of existing policies that have a reasoned basis are
not treated in the same manner.'O3
Courts may view such changes in agency position as a modification
or a reasonable extension of an existing policy and may grant due weight
or great weight deference.
Finally, "no deference is given to an agency's interpretation of a
statute when that interpretation conflicts with a prior appellate
99. 501 N.W.2d 391.
100. WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31 - 111.395 (1993-94).
101. The court of appeals and supreme court decisions in Marten both fail to discuss any
agency justifications for the disparate outcomes in the administrative proceedings. See
Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 491 N.W.2d 96
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 501 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 1993).
102. Marten, 501 N.W.2d at 393. Significantly, the court also noted another factor that
may have led to de novo review: the agency's withdrawal of its brief supporting the
administrative decision in Marten. See id. at 394.
103. See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 523
N.W.2d 172, 175-76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). It should be noted, however, that the party
challenging the agency's interpretation sought de novo review on the grounds that the
agency's decision was one of "first impression." The court of appeals disagreed because the
agency's interpretation "represent[ed] a modification or extension of a rule the [agency] has
long followed, and the modified rule itself has been in existence and applied for nearly a
decade." See id. at 176.
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decision." ° Under these circumstances, the court determines de novo
whether the agency properly applied the holding of the appellate
decision.' °s Because the courts have addressed the statute previously,
the agency is bound by these precedents unless the legislature rewrites
the statute or the courts modify their interpretation/° Thus, an agency
interpretation that is "inconsistent with... judicial authority... is, by
definition, unreasonable. 1'O Heightened scrutiny to determine the
agency's application of appellate court precedents seems logical, even if
the agency has significant experience in administering the statute.
III. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FORMALISTIC APPROACH
While the formalistic approach has identified several factors that
consider the institutional strengths and weaknesses of courts and
agencies, the factors form a complex set of rules that obscure the
institutional issues. Rather than examining the institutional questions
surrounding a particular case, the courts have applied the factors rigidly,
often trying to fit proverbial "square pegs" into "round holes."
Invariably, this approach has created conflicts in the case law over such
matters as whether a particular agency interpretation is one of first
impression requiring de novo review or, alternatively, one based on
some experience permitting due weight deference.
Cases that have reviewed statutory interpretations of the Tax
Appeals Commission illustrate this particular tension. In Zignego, a
case discussed earlier, the court of appeals concluded that the agency
was entitled to due weight deference because it had at least one prior
opportunity to analyze the statute at issue and formulate a position."° In
104. Local 60, Am. Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 579 N.W.2d 59,62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); see also Doering v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 523 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "it is
well established that the general deference given to an agency's application of a particular
statute does not apply when the agency's determination conflicts with prior case law
established by our supreme court").
105. See Local 60,562 N.W.2d at 62.
106. As the supreme court noted, an agency's interpretation should "not conflict with
the statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this court, or constitutional prohibitions."
Pabst v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 120 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Wis. 1963).
107. Local No. 695 v. LIRC, 452 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Wis. 1990); also cited in Jefferson
County, 523 N.W.2d at 175.
108. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Another unpublished opinion from
the court of appeals follows the logic of Zignego, concluding the Tax Appeals Commission
had previously interpreted the statutory provision at issue. See Ameritech Mobile
Communications, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 1997 WL603432 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
And, although that prior commission decision "did not decide the precise question at issue in
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another case challenging the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation
of a statute, the appellate court went further and granted the tax appeals
commission due weight deference in Wisconsin Department of Revenue
v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co., "recognizing that the issue [presented]
is one of first impression."' ' Heritage Mutual involved the commission's
interpretation of a state "add back" provision for a federal tax
deduction that is computed for state tax purposes.1 The court observed
that the agency's clarification of the ambiguity in the statute "invokes
the agency's expertise and experience in construing the tax laws
generally, and the interrelationship between the federal and state tax
laws specifically.'". The court justified this standard of review for the
commission's jurisdictional powers, stating that it "has primary
responsibility for policy determinations."' .
Zignego and Heritage Mutual suggest that the threshold for "some
experience" is met when the commission has considered one prior
analogous case or has extensive experience in promulgating a statutory
scheme that generally requires the interpretation of a federal statute.
However, the supreme court held exactly the opposite in La Crosse
Queen, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,13 which involved an
interpretation of the term "interstate commerce" in a taxing statute."4 It
wrote:
[T]his court will accord due weight [deference] to an agency
decision where the agency possesses particular expertise in an
area of law. In the case at bar, the Commission possesses no
special expertise because it has faced the task of interpreting the
term "interstate commerce" in light of [a Wisconsin statutory
provision] on only one previous occasion. Therefore we owe the
this case, the [commission]'s experience in construing tax exemption statutes entitles its
determination to some weight even though it may not previously have made the
determination of taxability or exemption in a particular fact situation." See id. at *5.
109. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 561 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997).
110. See WIs. STAT. § 71.45 (2) (1987-88).
111. Heritage Mut., 561 N.W.2d at 347.
112. Id. Another earlier case, Wisconsin Dep't of Rev. v. Lake Wisconsin Country Club,
follows a similar rationale stating that the court "should" defer to the Tax Appeals
Commission because the legal question is "intertwined with value or policy determinations"
even though the commission's interpretation was one of first impression. 365 N.W.2d 916,
918 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
113. 561 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1997).
114. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 77.54(13) (West 1999).
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decision of the Commission no deference."5
Courts are similarly mired in the question of whether an agency's
decision is "longstanding"-a critical requirement for great deference
review. As the court of appeals observed in Barron Electric, an agency
need not rule on the "precise" or even a "substantially similar" factual
situation for an interpretation to be longstanding."6 Instead, a court
should examine whether "the agency's experience in administering the
particular statutory scheme" is derived "from consideration of a variety
of factual situations and circumstances. '1 7 Yet, in Local Number 695 v.
Labor and Industry Review Commission-a case decided prior to
Harnischfeger-the supreme court reached the opposite conclusion."'
Local Number 695 involved a dispute over whether refunds of union
dues and reimbursement to union stewards for work time lost because
of union duties were "wages subject to the contribution requirements of
the unemployment compensation law."1 9 The commission concluded
that such forms of compensation were "wages" under § 108.02(26) of the
Wisconsin Statutes 20 It cited "no legal authority" and had never
addressed squarely the question of whether such reimbursements to
union stewards were "wages.12 In addition, through the appeals
process, both in the courts and the agency, each tribunal overruled the
one below it.22 From these facts, the majority opinion in Local Number
695 concluded that the "standard of review must necessarily be de
novo."
12
However, as the dissenting opinion in Local Number 695 notes, the
commission had extensive experience in determining what constituted
"wages" in a variety of cases as far back as the 1940s.24 The dissent
115. 561 N.W.2d at 688 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
116. Barron Elec. Coop. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 569 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997).
117. Id.
118. 452 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1990).
119. Id. at 371.
120. The relevant part of the statutory language reads: "Wages means every form of
remuneration payable for a given period.., to an individual for personal services." WIs.
STAT. § 108.02(26) (1985-86).
121. Local No. 695,452 N.W.2d at 371.
122. See id at 372.
123. Id
124. See id at 374 (J. Abrahamson, dissenting). Justice Abrahamson cited two earlier
cases as examples. See State Dep't of Transp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 361
N.W.2d 722 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 N.W.2d 743
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concluded that the commission had "expertise in applying the statutory
definition of wages and that the application of the statutory definition of
wages to the facts of this case is intertwined with the facts of the case
and values and policy determinations."'2' Under the analysis of Barron
Electric, the court should have adopted the dissent's position because
the commission had extensive experience in administering this particular
provision and, over the years, it had interpreted the statute under "a
variety of factual situations and circumstances." ' 6
Courts have also ignored the impact of certain criteria to determine
which level of deference is appropriate. For example, while some of the
cases have held that de novo review of an agency interpretation of a
statute is appropriate when the appellate courts have previously
interpreted the statute, 27 other courts have disregarded this exception
and have granted some deference to the agency's interpretation.'9 In
Margoles v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, a case involving a
statutory provision that the court of appeals had interpreted eight years
earlier, the court granted the agency great deference. 9 In another case
granting great deference to LIRC, the court of appeals found the
agency's interpretation of the statute at issue unreasonable, stating:
We are mindful of our obligation to give great weight deference
to LIRC's decision, but affirming its logic in this case would
totally eviscerate the statute's exception and case law
interpreting it.... As the supreme court cautioned in [a case
decided the prior year], that is not the current state of the law.'O
Even if one concedes that the legal outcome is the same however the
court chooses to interpret the impact on the standard of review in its
own prior case law, this approach provides little assistance to future
(Wis. 1942).
125. Local 695, 452 N.W.2d at 374 (dissenting).
126. Barron Elec., 569 N.W.2d at 732.
127. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Sauk County v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 477 N.W.2d
267, 272 (Wis. 1991) (granting great deference to WERC's interpretation of a statute in spite
of county's claim that WERC misinterpreted prior case law that dealt with the same statute).
See also Margoles v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 585 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998);
Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 165, 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
("LIRC has developed experience and expertise in deciding claims of sexual harassment
under the [Wisconsin Fair Employment Act], using the standards from federal cases ... .
129. 585 N.W.2d at 599 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
130. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 508 N.W.2d 927 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds 595 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1999) (emphasis added).
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litigants in cases that fall into more uncertain legal waters.
Compounding this particular problem even more, other courts have
declined to determine the appropriate standard of review entirely.
Instead, these courts have analyzed cases on the premise that the
outcome would be the same under any standard of review."'
Underlying the inconsistent application of the formalistic approach
in the cases is a recognition by the courts that this approach fails to
capture the true institutional interaction between courts and
administrative agencies. Many cases have also considered another
relevant factor of whether to grant deference in addition to those
applied in Harnischfeger and UFE. Addressing this alternate factor in
West Bend Education Association v. WERC, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated that where "a legal question is intertwined with factual
determinations or with value or policy determinations... a court should
defer to the agency which has primary responsibility for determination
of fact and policy."'32 Subsequent cases have repeated this factor as a
consideration in determining the appropriate standard of review.'33 This
factor extends beyond other formal distinctions in the standard of
review, such as that between "question of fact" and "question of law."
'
'
1
However, this approach is inherently institutional; it recognizes that an
administrative agency may be in a better position to determine the
meaning of a statute that has significant policy ramifications.
Other cases discuss the standard of review question with an even
greater emphasis on institutional choice. As discussed earlier, the La
Crosse Queen court confronted a situation where the Tax Appeals
Commission had extended its taxing authority in its interpretation of
131. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. State, 562 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1997); American
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 586 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1998); Knight v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 582 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
132. 357 N.W.2d 534,539-40 (Wis. 1984). This passage is similarly cited in Sauk County,
477 N.W.2d at 270.
133. See, e.g., Kannenberg, 571 N.W.2d at 171; Barron Elea, 569 N.W.2d at 731 ("We
will also pay great deference to an agency's interpretation 'if it is intertwined with value and
policy determinations' inherent in the agency's decisionmaking function." (citation and
quoted source omitted)); Sterlingworth Condominium Ass'n v. Department of Natural
Resources, 556 N.W.2d 791, 798-99 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). These cases do not agree on the
appropriate standard of review when the agency interpretation is indeed intertwined with a
policy or value judgment. The Barron court suggested great deference, while others have
granted due weight deference. See, e.g., Department of Rev. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 561
N.W.2d 344, 347 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (applying due weight deference and stating "[b]ecause
the [agency] has primary responsibility for policy determinations, we conclude that the agency
determination is properly accorded some degree of deference").
134. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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"interstate commerce."'35 The commission had decided the same issue
in one prior decision. However, the La Crosse Queen court specifically
observed that the agency "possessed no special expertise.
' ' 3
Significantly, the commission had interpreted a widely used legal term
which the Wisconsin courts have applied for years."" In reviewing the
commission interpretation de novo, it is clear that the court concluded
that the agency had no institutional advantage over it to ascertain the
meaning of the statute.
In another case, the supreme court also viewed the issue of the
appropriate standard of review through an institutional perspective. In
Byers v. LIRC, the court conceded that the agency had some experience
in interpreting the statute at issue, but decided not to accord
deference.'m As the court explained:
In some cases involving issues of statutory interpretation the
courts give deference to the interpretation of the administrative
agency because of the agency's expertise in the area. But
although [the agency] has experience in resolving questions
about the exclusive remedy provision of the [Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act] the courts also have significant experience with
this subject matter 39
In yet another supreme court case that discusses de novo review, the
court noted that if it has expertise equal to an agency, no deference
should be accorded to the agency's determination." Thus, while the
135. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
136. 561 N.W.2d at 688.
137. See, e.g., Midcontinent Broad. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 297 N.W.2d 191
(Wis. 1980); State v. Amoco Oil Co., 293 N.W.2d 487 (Wis. 1980); City of Madison v. Hyland,
Hall & Co., 243 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1976); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis.
1966); Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 111 N.W.2d 148 (Wis.
1961); Metropolitan Fin. Corp. v. Matthews, 61 N.W.2d 502 (Wis. 1953); Town of LaPointe v.
Madeline Is. Ferry Line, Inc., 508 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Wisconsin Tele. Co. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 371 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
138. 561 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1997).
139. Id. at 680 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
140. See Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement Bd., 562 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Wis. 1997). The
court, however, treated the question of whether an agency's determination is "clearly one of
first impression" and the issue of the agency's expertise relative to the court as two different
matters. The court held:
An agency's interpretation of a statute will be reviewed de novo if any of the
following are true: (1) the issue before the agency is clearly one of first impression;
(2) a legal question is presented and there is no evidence of any special agency
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formalistic approach may provide a proxy for how a court should review
an agency interpretation, it does not mirror it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recognizing that state agencies may have a comparative advantage
over courts in interpreting ambiguous statutes in certain contexts,
Wisconsin courts have accorded agencies deference in certain
circumstances. In the determination of the appropriate level of
deference, a complex set of cases has evolved that emphasize multi-
factored legal rules for three different standards of review. These legal
rules represent a formalistic approach that strives to select the
institution in the better position to determine the meaning of an
ambiguous statute.14 ' However, these rules represent a rough proxy for
an institutional comparison. As a result, courts have sometimes elected
not to follow the logical outcome of the rules, because the rules
sometimes fail to recognize which institution is in a better position to
interpret the statute.
Putting aside the various rules of the formalistic approach and its
apparent conflicts, the decision of whether a court should grant
deference to an administrative agency is primarily one of institutional
choice that requires two separate inquiries. One concerns authority and
the other concerns experience. The first inquiry begins with the
question of whether the legislature has conferred upon the agency the
authority to interpret and enforce the statute. The formalistic approach
addresses this concern by considering such factors as whether the
expertise or experience; or (3) the agency's position on an issue has been so
inconsistent that it provides no real guidance.
Iat
141. See Hofer, supra note 2, at 239-40 (observing that state agencies may be in a "better
position" to determine the meaning of a statute). Hofer states:
"Better position" may also account for a notable exception to the principle that
appellate courts do not defer to lower tribunals on questions of law. Where an
administrative agency has significant expertise in applying a statutory concept to a
concrete fact situation, the court reviewing that decision should give weight to the
agency's value judgment. Here, the initial tribunal's better position is not based
upon its witnessing some particular litigant, witness, or trial. Rather, deference is
paid to expertise developed through an agency's experience in implementing the
statute. Hence, an administrative agency may be put in a better position than an
appellate court by virtue of the agency's repeated administering of a statute.
Id at 240.
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legislature charged the agency to administer the statute and whether the
interpretation will provide a uniform and consistent application of the
statute. If the evidence indicates that no such delegation has occurred,
no deference should be given. If, however, administration of the statute
does fall within the ambit of the agency's authority, the court must then
examine whether the agency has had more experience in interpreting
the statute than the court has had. When a court has had greater
experience in interpreting the terms of the statute or the general
principles that apply to the statute from previous cases, no deference
should be given to the agency's interpretation. However, courts should
defer to an agency when it is better placed to interpret the statute.
The formalistic approach recognizes a number of scenarios under
which an agency may be in a better position to interpret the statute.
The agency's specialized expertise may make it better qualified to
interpret the statute than a court that is by nature a generalist. Thus,
whether an agency's interpretation of the statute is longstanding and
based on its experience is clearly relevant.
However, the formalistic approach fails to adequately capture all the
situations where deference should or should not be applied. Courts
have often reached divergent results in very similar cases. Moreover,
the three tiers of deference under the formalistic approach magnify the
complexity of the review process. An approach that more directly
addresses the institutional issues could only lift the shroud of fog that
obscures this field of law.
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